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There have been concerting policy and legal initiatives to mitigate the privacy harm resulting
from badly designed software technology. But one main challenge to realizing these initiatives is
the di±culty in translating proposed principles and regulations into concrete and veri¯able
evidence in technology. This is partly due to the lack of systematic techniques and tools to
address privacy in the software design, hence making it di±cult for the designer to measure
disclosure risk in a more intuitive way, taking into account the privacy objective that matters to
each end user. To bridge this gap, we propose a framework for verifying the satisfaction of user
privacy objectives in software design. Our approach is based on the (un)awareness that users
acquire when information is disclosed, as it relates to the communication properties of objects in
a design. This property is used to determine the expected privacy utility that users will derive
from the design for a speci¯ed privacy objective. We demonstrate through case studies how this
approach can help designers determine which design decision undermines users' privacy
expectations and better design alternatives.
Keywords: Software design; privacy engineering; awareness.
1. Introduction
Seemingly innocuous design decisions during software engineering can unintention-
ally a®ect user privacy. This is aggravated with ubiquitous systems such as wear-
ables, cars and services that we depend on now becoming privacy threats because of
their ability to seamlessly communicate with each other [25]. Bad software design
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may undermine information protection by distorting user expectations and obscur-
ing privacy harm. When this happens, users are tempted to give up on privacy and
lose con¯dence in the technology. For example, studies have shown that most adults
do not believe online service providers will keep their data private and secure [39].
Whereas it is common for software engineers to design the systems and not
consider privacy, but rather delineated as the end users' problem for not being able to
exercise control. Even worse is where privacy is only considered as an afterthought
later in the development life cycle. In part, this is due to lack of incentives to invest in
secure design since end users cannot readily tell which software preserves privacy and
which does not at the point of sale [2]. This can make the designers comfortable
ignoring or indulging in privacy-corrosive design and hoping for the best [25]. A more
savory reason is that designers often lack appropriate tools and analysis techniques
to determine the extent to which a design representation preserves privacy [40, 41].
Irrespective of the rationale for ignoring privacy, it demonstrates the impact of the
lack of systematic consideration of privacy during software design.
It is also a common practice to align users' privacy needs and regulatory compliance
through privacy policies  describing data collection, processing and distribution
activities carried out by the software. The speci¯cation of such policies is majorly
business–driven and carried out by legal experts with little or no insights from the
software engineer. This makes it di±cult to link policy statements with demonstrable
evidence of their satisfaction in software design [4]. A further undesirable observation is
that these statements have becomemore complicated over the years and now are rarely
read by users. For example, Google's privacy policy statement has grown from 600 to
4000 words over the past 20 years, and their adjustments in response to GDPR have
seen a 30% increase in the number of words.a The use of policy-based solutions in this
way is symptomatic ofmasking deeply rooted privacy design problems in software with
super¯cial privacy policy statements as solutions.
Consequently, the privacy by design paradigm has become a vital part of the
dialog on what counts as good and e®ective privacy, and is often used as a slogan for
systems built with privacy considered from the onset. Its opposite is responding to
privacy harm after it has occurred. This initiative was passed by the Privacy
Commissioners and Data Protection Authorities as an essential component of fun-
damental privacy protection. The objective was to help companies protect privacy
by embedding a set of seven foundational principles into the design speci¯cation of
technologies, business practices and physical infrastructures [14]. One of the prin-
ciples even argues for the need to support privacy promises with a systematic and
demonstrable evidence.
But the challenge with privacy by design is the lack of any underpinning or
engineering understanding of those principles during software design [15, 25]. This
research is therefore motivated by the increased need for demonstrable evidence of
privacy preservation in software design. The expectation is that such evidence will
ahttps://policies.google.com/privacy/archive?hl=en-US.
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help software designers make appropriate design choices. Speci¯cally, this paper
investigates a framework for demonstrating that interactions between objects in a
software design enhance or abate the ability to realize a privacy objective. Such
evidence can then be used by designers to distinguish between a good and a bad
design from a privacy standpoint. This research is timely. Given the multitude of
design patterns used in designing software, it remains unclear how the interaction
between objects impacts on the ability of the software to preserve privacy; in par-
ticular, service-oriented software used for \wiring up" everyday objects to be part of
the Internet of Things, social networks, mobile systems and e-commerce.
The central thesis of this research is that a software design that preserves privacy
uses the appropriate disclosure protocol to enable interaction between objects. Such
disclosure protocol maximizes the satisfaction of a privacy objective. The framework
for investigating this assumption in a software design is shown in Fig. 1.
The framework takes as input a software design representing the behavior of a
system. This input is used to generate an intermediate interaction model (Secs. 4–6).
The model identi¯es interacting objects and provides insights on the interaction
history that the design will generate when implemented. In Sec. 4.1, we demonstrate
how this history di®ers from the perspective of each object, and how it evolves based
on the dynamic assignment of roles as information subject, sender or recipient.
Di®ering interaction history implies that the (un)awareness of interacting parties
(and therefore the extent of privacy realized) also di®ers. The interaction model
represents this distinct (un)awareness in the memory of objects in Sec. 4.2. We
demonstrate how a spectrum of (un)awareness ranging from being fully unaware to
fully aware can be measured. When actions speci¯ed in a design are invoked, there is
a transformation in the memory of associated objects along this spectrum. From an
analytical viewpoint, these actions are synonymous to information-°ow transactions
de¯ned by an object either requesting, consenting, sending or notifying another
object about information. In Sec. 5, we outline how these memory transformations
occur. Typically, information disclosure will consist of an ordered set of one or more
Fig. 1. Framework for verifying the satisfaction of a privacy objective in a software design.
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transactions to de¯ne a disclosure protocol. Section 6 outlines precedence rules for
transactions in a disclosure protocol, and also the consistency of object memory after
transformation.
We implemented PriSATb as a tool for reasoning about privacy in software de-
sign. The tool generates an intermediate interaction model representing a software
design and facilitates the mapping of disclosure protocols to interaction between
objects speci¯ed in the design. Given a privacy objective and assigned disclosure
protocols, PriSAT generates the expected privacy utility that each object will derive
from the design. In this manner, the designer can compare di®erent design alter-
natives to make informed design choice.
Our evaluation consists of two case studies. In Sec. 7.2, a followership network
design on Twitter is reverse engineered. The case study focuses on the scenario where
users interact with their followers privately. Our choice is based on the view that
Twitter represents an example of a system where the traditional assumption that the
impact of privacy can be localized to avoid contagion on other users' privacy becomes
di±cult to hold [58]. This is mainly due to the temporal and spatial distributions of
objects, as well as the autonomous nature of associated users. On Twitter, it is easy
for information once disclosed to reach unintended recipients, and users may be
unsure if an information-°ow path will ultimately lead to privacy violation. The
study showed that the design's ability to realize a privacy objective on Twitter varied
as information °owed in the network. This suggests that using the same disclosure
protocol to foster interaction between any objects introduced asymmetry in the level
of privacy each gets on the network. It was also observed that there is a maximum
limit on the level of privacy that a design can o®er. We demonstrated how a light-
weight refactoring of the design can improve this limit.
The second case study in Sec. 7.3 presents a scenario analysis involving a family of
interaction patterns for designing service-oriented software systems. These ranged
from patterns where interactions between the information producer and consumer
are facilitated or mediated via a broker using a push or pull mechanism, or a hybrid
of both, with or without binding. Popular frameworks and standard speci¯cations
such as Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) [18] for facilitating inter-
action between objects in Internet of Things, RESTful APIs [31] for e-commerce
applications and messaging systems [33] are designed using one or more of these
patterns. Using scenario analysis, our aim is to highlight the limits of the privacy-
preserving capabilities of these patterns. This study demonstrates how design choices
in a service-oriented software system inhibit or enhance the ability for an information
producer, broker and/or consumer to realize a privacy objective. We show how the
choice of a design pattern can be determined based on a balance of functional and
privacy expectations. On the whole, this research will bene¯t academia, industry and
policy makers with interest in addressing privacy by design challenges of real-world
software systems.
bhttp://www.prisat.org.
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2. Background
Software design and privacy are the core concepts of this research. There are
numerous views on what constitutes a good software design [25, 48, 56, 12]. Broadly,
software design comprises the speci¯cation of how systems are architected, how it
functions, how it communicates and how the architecture, function and communi-
cation a®ect users. A design is judged to be good if it leads to software that is correct
(does what it should), robust (tolerant of misuse), °exible (adaptable to shifting
requirements), reusable, e±cient, reliable and usable [16, 22]. Ultimately, a good
design depends on the software engineer making the right design decisions. This
is important since every design decision re°ects an intent on how the software is
to function or be used, as well as users' expectations as to how the software is
compatible with contextual norms.
Likewise, there are diverse views of privacy in software. But we focus on a
viewpoint that is based on (un)awareness, as it relates to communication properties
of objects in a design and how end users interact via the objects. Such properties
imbibe object states in the design which directly impacts the ability of the software
to preserve privacy. This is as a consequence of the information disclosed to users
when an object enters or exits a state. Broadly, (un)awareness is central to the
manner by which we foster interactions in social settings. We coordinate and regulate
our disclosure behavior based on our awareness about those we interact with and
what information we want them to be aware or unaware. In a software-mediated
setting, if a user was previously unaware of a fact, then a subsequent disclosure
action may evolve the memory of objects representing the user, making the user
aware of that fact. It is assumed here that the (un)awareness that is modeled in an
object is perceived in the same way as its user. Hence, the two factors that can
in°uence a user's disclosure behavior are: (1) the user's current (un)awareness; and
(2) the desired (un)awareness that other users should have after disclosure. Hence,
privacy is the ability for a user to regulate the evolution of its (un)awareness, and
that of others, during information disclosure. The privacy objective during such
regulation may be to increase awareness (information visibility) or unawareness
(information secrecy) for one or more users.
Hence, verifying that a software design preserves privacy centers on how objects
interact in the design and whether such interaction satis¯es a privacy objective. We
are of the view that a systematic approach to considering the disclosure protocols
used for interaction between objects can (1) provide insights on the extent a privacy
objective is satis¯ed and (2) be used to select a better design from a set of alter-
natives. There are many of such disclosure protocols. For example, in order to satisfy
a privacy objective, it may be essential that when information is requested by a
recipient, then the sender is required to seek consent from the subject before the
information is sent to the recipient. For other cases, it may be that a granted consent
is acknowledged by the sender, and the subject is noti¯ed when information is sent to
the recipient [38]. Indeed, there are numerous ways to combine information request,
A Privacy Awareness System for Software Design 1561
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consent, send and notice actions to de¯ne a disclosure protocol, with each combi-
nation likely to generate a di®erent level of privacy satisfaction since it results in a
unique (un)awareness transformation in the memory of associated objects.
3. Related Works
Hoepman [29] de¯ned a design strategy as an approach to achieve a certain design
goal. This favors certain structural organization of the design or schemes over others,
and contains properties that enable its distinction from other approaches that
achieve the same goal. Hoepman also extended this view to de¯ne a privacy design
strategy as a design strategy that achieves (some level of) privacy protection as its
goal. We leverage on this view to investigate how the structure of a design and the
limitations on disclosure protocols can vary across software design, as well as provide
insights into the e®ectiveness of an alternative.
This research contributes to achieving privacy by design in software. While
this paradigm has gained traction in policy circles, its actual integration into the
design of software remains an open research question [24, 5]. A review by Bernsmed
[9] summarized di®erent approaches to operationalize privacy by design into existing
software engineering processes. These include the Information and Privacy Com-
missioner of Ontario industry report on operationalizing privacy by design as a guide
to implementing strong privacy practices [15] and the OASIS Privacy Management
Reference Model and Methodology (PMRM) [47] for software engineering teams
to analyze the system from a privacy perspective and to help them identify
necessary technical and process mechanisms that should be implemented to support
privacy. Similarly, Microsoft [46] and NOKIA [45] have, respectively, presented
their engineering methodologies to bridge the gap between privacy laws and
principles and techniques to foster the realization of privacy by design. One novel
contribution is in the area of privacy impact assessments [54]; speci¯cally, to enable
the designer to carry out an assessment of designed software platforms to determine
the level of privacy risk that users are exposed to, and any associated mitigation
measures.
Developer-centered security is an emerging research area focused on how to get
developers to build more secure systems from the start [44, 57]. While the traditional
focus of cybersecurity research has been on developing new technologies and systems,
in recent years, this is shifting to understanding the software engineer and how they
are supported in creating secure products [53, 23]. One central theme is to explore
and improve the tool support and techniques that are available to software builders.
While process-centric tools exist for understanding the relationship between the
software engineering process and privacy [1, 35], there is very little research on how
to provide the developer with insights on the privacy-preserving capability of the
product itself. This research contributes to this endeavor by investigating an analysis
technique that enables the developer to understand how their design approach to
achieve information disclosure in software impacts on user privacy.
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Normative research has been applied in reasoning about privacy. Breaux et al. [11]
used description logic to analyze privacy in data-°ow speci¯cation with multi-party
expectations. Similarly, Barth et al. [7] proposed the use of a temporal logic frame-
work for expressing and reasoning about normative protocols in privacy legislation.
Calikli et al. [13] used inductive logic programming to learn privacy norms in social
software. Furthermore, Aucher et al. [6] applied modal and deontic logic in reasoning
about obligations, permissions, knowledge and information exchange in the context
of privacy policy compliance. A similar technique is applied by He and Antón [26] in
the modeling of privacy requirements in role engineering. Our reasoning mechanism
complements these existing approaches. We applied an awareness model based on
possible world semantics to understand the nature of interaction between interacting
objects in a software design and the privacy implications.
Finally, this work relates to access control in computing which typically involves
the need to divulge information to authorized objects only [8]. An object here is a
generic term that refers to an active agent capable of initiating or performing a
computation of some sort. Access modes are broadly categorized into read, write and
execute privileges granted to an object. Our technique provides a means to investi-
gate the underlying engineering actions that lead to granted privileges and associated
privacy risk; for example, the manner in which information is requested, consent is
sought after, information is sent and user is noti¯ed. Indeed, our proposed approach
provides a mechanism to determine the extent to which the de¯ned access control
policies help preserve privacy.
4. Modeling Awareness, Unawareness and Privacy
The privacy threat envisaged relates to a networked setting where privacy is de-
pendent not only on an individual's action but also on those of other users. If this
interdependence is ignored during software design, it can lead to end-user perception
of loss over the control of their personal information after disclosure. Our threat
model therefore builds on the Communication Privacy Management Theory, which
de¯nes information disclosure management in terms of privacy ownership, control
and turbulence [43]. This theory is based on the principle that users believe they
own and have a right to control their private information, and such control
is achieved using personal privacy rules. When others are given access to a
user's private information, they become co-owners of that information. Such co-
owners need to negotiate on the mutually agreeable privacy rules about telling
others. Privacy boundary turbulence occurs when co-owners do not e®ectively
negotiate and follow mutually-held privacy rules, subsequently providing the per-
ception of control loss.
The focus of this paper is to mitigate the threat of privacy turbulence resulting
from inappropriate information disclosure in a software design. Hence, an interaction
model for analyzing software design is necessary to reveal the relationship between a
privacy objective, the disclosure protocols used to enable interaction between objects
A Privacy Awareness System for Software Design 1563
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and the resulting privacy utility for end users. In this section, we discuss the com-
ponents of this model.
4.1. Behavior modeling with role-based interaction history
General knowledge modeling involves creating a computer interpretable model of
knowledge [34]. Adopting a similar approach, our aim is to create a model that
represents the behavior exhibited when users disclose or receive information via their
surrogate objects. This is a role-based interaction described by the information °ow
ti, involving the disclosure of the proposition  about a subject (su) from a sender (s)
to a recipient (r):
tið Þ ¼ ðUi;RÞ; ð1Þ
where
. Ui is the set of objects associated with ti;
. R ¼ fsu; s; rg are the roles that object in Ui can assume;
. roles : Ui ! 2R is a function mapping each object uj to a set of roles, rolesðujÞ  R.
When the sender discloses  about itself to the recipient, then s and su refer to the
same object. Alternatively, before  is disclosed by the sender to a recipient, it is
either generated by the sender or is granted custody by the subject. In this case, s, su
and r refer to di®erent objects. Finally, an object can also assume the roles of subject
and recipient. This is when the sender sends  about a subject to the subject. Here, su
and r refer to the same object. The ¯rst and last scenarios highlight the duality of
roles during information °ow. The sender cannot send  to itself. This makes it
impossible for s and r to reference the same object.
Furthermore, when  is disclosed by multiple objects during interaction, an
information °ow path is formed. Formally, a path is a sequence of information
°ows represented by
t0<inð Þ ¼
Xn
i¼1
ðUi;RÞ;
where n is the path length and Ui  U . When s 2 rolesðujÞ at t1, then uj is the path
source. Whereas, if uj is the recipient of  at t1, then the information °ow at t2 is
dependent on uj to switching its role from recipient to a sender. This switching of
roles propagates  from t1 up to tn. A backtrack occurs along a path when the sender
at ti discloses  to a sender at tk<i; for instance, an interaction involving u1 and u2
where u1 sends  to u2, then u2 sends back  to u1. A path terminates at tn when the
intended destination of  is reached without backtracking. Alternatively, a path
terminates at tn when a backtrack occurs. At this point, a cycle is formed and
terminated to prevent paths of in¯nite length over  .
Disclosed information may be attributed to one or more subjects. For the latter,
attribution can be prede¯ned statically, with all the subjects in  determined before
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disclosure at t1. Alternatively, attribution is determined dynamically as the infor-
mation °ows along a path. In this case, an object that assumes the role of a sender at
tn1 may become a subject at tn. The role of a subject is permanent once assigned and
cannot be switched over the history of a path. Whereas, since a path terminates once
a backtrack is observed, an object can switch the roles of sender and recipient no
more than once and twice, respectively, along a path. Finally, information may °ow
concurrently along any two paths t10<in and t
2
0<im. The result is an interaction
network consisting of all information-°ow paths:
Tnetð Þ ¼ ft10<inð Þ; t20<imð Þ; . . . ; t j0<ikð Þg:
Assume an interaction between the set of objects u1–u5 over  about u1. First, u1
discloses  to u2 and u3. Subsequently, u2 and u3 disclose  to u4 and u5, respectively.
Finally, u4 sends back  to u1 and u2 and also discloses to u5. The graph diagram,
interaction network (represented as adjacency matrix), resulting information °ow
paths and role-based interaction histories for static and dynamic subject attributions
are illustrated in Fig. 2. In extracting paths from the interaction network, the order
in which the disclosure actions are executed is nonconsequential and the longest
possible path that satis¯es backtracking constraint is assumed. It can be observed
that each object in the network generates a peculiar interaction history based on its
roles during each information °ow. An alternative information-°ow setting may
result in a di®erent interaction history. Our objective is to understand how these
variations in disclosure behavior can be used to articulate the level of (un)awareness
that objects attain about disclosed information. Subsequently, we explore how such
(un)awareness can be regulated in a software design to preserve privacy.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 2. Role-based interaction histories from the viewpoints of u1–u5 using static and dynamic subject
attributions.
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4.2. The (un)awareness of objects
Early works on reasoning about awareness in interactive settings assume limited
rationality of objects [17, 20, 27]. This implies that when the information is disclosed,
the awareness obtained by objects would vary within a spectrum of being fully aware
of the information to fully unaware. In this Subsection, we leverage on this as-
sumption to set the foundations for reasoning about the relationship between soft-
ware design and the awareness generated by the interaction properties of objects in
that design. To achieve this, the memory of an object based on its interaction with
other objects about  is represented using possible world semantics for describing
alternative worlds (modes) and accessibility relations between such worlds [49, 28].
When  is disclosed in an information °ow, then the subject, sender and recipient
who are previously unaware may become aware of  and its related propositions.
Thus, the (un)awareness contained in the memory of an object about  can be
modeled using Mð Þ ¼ ðW ; p;R; I;wcÞ, where
. W is a set of possible worlds each considering a unique viewpoint on  ;
. p is referred to as the principal and represents the object whose memory contains
the (un)awareness of  ;
. R 2 2fsu;s;rg; 8su 2 SU, is a set of reference objects whose (un)awareness about  
may be considered by the principal. Each subject, sender or recipient may assume
the role of a principal and/or a reference object;
. I  W W is the accessibility relation on W . Given two worlds w1;w2 2W , the
principal ¯nds  in w1 indistinguishable from  in w2;
. wc is the current world of p.
To distinguish between an object being aware and the one that is unaware, we de¯ne
an awareness instance in the memory of an object to consist of a principal and the
optional reference objects, represented by the modal operator A. Similarly, an un-
awareness instance contains a principal with optional reference objects, represented
by the operator :A. A composite instance contains more than one operator. Oth-
erwise, the instance is atomic. The utilization of this operator precludes the valuation
of the truth of a proposition as expected in reasoning about knowledge. In the
following, we generate four (un)awareness classes in the memory of p based on M .
[A1] The ¯rst class represents a principal being aware or unaware of the atomic
proposition f (i.e.  ¼ f). Instances of this class only contain the principal with no
reference object, rendering R an empty set. Determining whether p is aware or
unaware of f can be modeled by considering W as a set of two possible worlds. The
¯rst world is w1 where p does not consider f possible and is written as :f. The second
world, w2, is the world where p considers f possible. The accessibility relations
between these two worlds are illustrated in Fig. 3. From w1, both w1 and w2 are
accessible. Whereas, from w2, only w2 is accessible. The unshaded world are Fig. 3
represents the current world of p. When p's current world is w1, then p is unaware
of f and it is represented as :Apf. This is because in this world, :f in w1 is
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indistinguishable from f in w2. Conversely, when p's current world is w2, then p is
aware of f and it is represented as Apf. This is because f is uniquely distinguishable
from w2 since it no longer considers w1 accessible. In summary, let Mp represent the
memory of principal p. When reasoning about p's (un)awareness of f, then :Apf and
Apf exist in the memory of p thus
A1p ¼ f:Apf;Apfg and 8a 2 A1p; a 2Mp:
[A2] The second class enables the principal to consider whether a reference object
is aware or unaware of f. In this case,  is a composite proposition. Hence, A2 is a
class of (un)awareness that can be used to reason about instances inA1. Instances of
A2 can only contain one reference object. Thus, R may contain either the subject,
sender or recipient. We refer to this potential reference object as r 0. Determining
whether p is aware or unaware that r 0 is aware or unaware of f can be realized by ¯rst
generating the (un)awareness of r 0 about f asA1r 0 ¼ f:Ar 0f;Ar 0fg. The next step is
to consider every instance in A1r 0 as  and apply similar heuristics used in realizing
p's (un)awareness of f as highlighted in A1 for each  . The result is a set of possible
worlds, their accessibility relations and p's (un)awareness given its current world and
 as shown in Fig. 4. In summary, when considering whether p is (un)aware that a
reference object r 0 is (un)aware of f, then :ApAr 0f, ApAr 0f, :Ap:Ar 0f and Ap:Ar 0f
exist in the memory of p thus
A2p ¼ f:ApAr 0f;ApAr 0f;:Ap:Ar 0f;Ap:Ar 0fg and
8a 2 A2p; a 2Mp:
[A3] The third class enables the principal to consider the (un)awareness that a
reference object may have about the principal. Hence, A3 is also a composite
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 4. The (un)awareness of a principal (p) about the (un)awareness of r 0.
(a) (b)
Fig. 3. The (un)awareness of a principal (p) about the proposition f.
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proposition and represents the class of (un)awareness that can be used to reason
about instances in A2. Instances of A3 contain one reference object and a principal.
The reference can either be the subject, sender or recipient. Again, we refer to the
potential ¯rst reference object as r 0. Determining whether p is aware or unaware that
r 0 is aware or unaware that p is aware or unaware of f is realized by ¯rst generating
the (un)awareness of r 0 about p being aware or unaware of f. Thus
A2r 0 ¼ f:Ar 0Apf;Ar 0Apf;:Ar 0:Apf;Ar 0:Apfg:
The next step is to consider every instance in A2r 0 as  and apply similar heuristics
used in realizing p's (un)awareness of f as highlighted in A1 for each  . The result
is a set of possible worlds, their accessibility relations and p's (un)awareness given
its current world and  as shown in Fig. 5. In summary, when considering whether p
is (un)aware that a reference object r 0 is (un)aware that p is (un)aware of f, then the
memory of p is de¯ned by adding every instance of A3p to Mp. Thus
A3p ¼ f:Ap:Ar 0Apf;Ap:Ar 0Apf;:ApAr 0Apf;ApAr 0Apf;
:Ap:Ar 0:Apf;Ap:Ar 0:Apf;:ApAr 0:Apf;ApAr 0:Apfg and
8a 2 A3p; a 2Mp:
[A4] This ¯nal class enables the principal to consider the (un)awareness that a
reference object has about other references. Hence, A4 is also a class of (un)aware-
ness that can be used to reason about instances in A2 where  is a composite
proposition. Instances of this class contain two reference objects, these are any
ordered pair of subject, sender and recipient. We refer to this ordered pair as r1 and
r2. Determining whether p is aware or unaware that r1 is aware or unaware that
r2 is aware or unaware of f can be realized by ¯rst generating the (un)awareness of
r1 about r2 being aware or unaware of f and vice versa. Thus
A2r1 ¼ f:Ar1Ar2f;Ar1Ar2f;:Ar1:Ar2f;Ar1:Ar2fg;
A2r2 ¼ f:Ar2Ar1f;Ar2Ar1f;:Ar2:Ar1f;Ar2:Ar1fg:
(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g) (h)
Fig. 5. The (un)awareness of a principal (p) about the (un)awareness of r 0 about the (un)awareness of p.
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The next step is to consider every instance in A2r1 and A2r2 as  and apply similar
heuristics used in realizing p's (un)awareness of f as highlighted in A1 for each  .
The result is a set of possible worlds, their accessibility relations and p's
(un)awareness given its current world and  as shown in Fig. 6. In summary, when
considering whether p is (un)aware that a reference object r1 is (un)aware that
another reference object r2 is (un)aware of f, then the memory of p is de¯ned by
adding every instance of A4p to Mp. Thus
A4p ¼ f:Ap:Ar1Ar2f;Ap:Ar1Ar2f;:ApAr1Ar2f;ApAr1Ar2f;
:Ap:Ar1:Ar2f;Ap:Ar1:Ar2f;:ApAr1:Ar2f;ApAr1:Ar2f;
:Ap:Ar2Ar1f;Ap:Ar2Ar1f;:ApAr2Ar1f;ApAr2Ar1f;
:Ap:Ar2:Ar1f;Ap:Ar2:Ar1f; z:ApAr2:Ar1f;ApAr2:Ar1fg
and 8a 2 A4p; a 2Mp:
4.3. Object memory
The subject, sender or recipient can assume unique or dual roles as the principal and/
or reference object in an instance of a class. When the roles are unique, then two
consecutive (un)awareness operators cannot refer to the same object in that instance.
For this case, there are 42 (un)awareness instances from A1, A2, A3 and A4,
respectively, in the memory of a principal as illustrated in Table 1. These instances
(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g) (h)
(i) (j) (k) (l)
(m) (n) (o) (p)
Fig. 6. The (un)awareness of a principal (p) about the (un)awareness of r1 about the (un)awareness of r2.
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capture all the (un)awareness that a subject, sender or recipient will acquire about
disclosed information and the related (un)awareness propositions. For each class,
there is a set of (un)awareness instances with the same principal and reference
object(s). For example, labels 3, 4, 5 and 6 in column Msu of Table 1 constitute the
set of all (un)awareness instances of type A2 in the memory of the subject with the
sender as a reference object. Whereas, labels 7, 8, 9 and 10 are the set of all (un)
awareness instances of type A2 in the memory of the subject with the recipient as a
reference object. This uniqueness of roles in an information °ow represents the (un)
awareness an object has about the (un)awareness of other parties during disclosure.
When roles are not unique, then a principal can also be a reference object. In this
case, two consecutive (un)awareness operators may refer to the same object. This
duality of roles during information °ow depicts self-awareness where an object is
(un)aware of its own (un)awareness. This phenomenon is normally assumed in
standard models of belief and knowledge as positive and negative introspections
[10, 55]. An object is positively introspective if it is aware that it is aware of  
whenever it is aware of  . Similarly, an object is negatively introspective if it is aware
that it is unaware of  whenever it is unaware of  . This observation does not a®ect
the instances of A1 since it only contains a principal. Whereas, for instances of A2
andA3, the principal and the reference are the same object. Hence, instance labels 3,
7 and 4, 8 in A2, respectively, depict the ability/inability of an object to positively
introspect given that the object becomes (un)aware that it is aware of f. Also, labels
5, 9 and 6, 10, respectively, represent the ability/inability of an object to negatively
introspect given that the object is (un)aware that it is (un)aware of f. Similar views
of positive and negative introspections are observed for labels 11–26 inA3, where an
object is (un)aware that it is (un)aware that it is (un)aware of f. For A4, although
the two reference objects remain a unique pair, the principal and one element of the
pair can refer to the same object. This results in positive and negative introspections
Table 1. The memory of objects involved in an information °ow.
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for labels 47–42, where an object becomes (un)aware that it is (un)aware that
another object is (un)aware of f.
4.4. Awareness di®erential
At any moment in time, an (un)awareness instance may or may not be tenable in the
memory of an object. An instance becomes untenable when a principal considers it no
longer reasonable as a result of a disclosure action, and vice versa. For example, it is
tenable for the recipient to consider that it is aware of f after it receives f from the
sender. Conversely, it is untenable for a recipient to consider that it is unaware of f
after it has received f from the sender. The transition of an awareness instance from a
tenable to untenable state or vice versa is based on the executed disclosure protocol
during information °ow as detailed in Sec. 6. Categorizing each (un)awareness in-
stance in the memory of a principal in this manner enables the distinction between
di®erent levels of (un)awareness resulting from an information °ow.
De¯nition 1. A principal p is fully unaware of a proposition  if for every tenable
instance a with respect to  in the memory of p, the actual world of p is w1.
Otherwise, information °ow generates full or partial awareness of  whose se-
verity is determined by the number of tenable instances in w1 or w2. This measure
depicts the level of doubt that the principal may have about disclosed information,
and computed as the awareness di®erential
ADiffðp;AiÞ ¼
 1
 1 þ ;
where
.  is the number of tenable instances of class Ai with the same reference object(s)
in Mp;
.  is the number of instances of class Ai with the same reference object(s) in Mp;
.  is the number of tenable unawareness instances of class Ai with the same ref-
erence object(s) inMp, and acts as a discriminator between full awareness and full
unawareness.
Assume for the classA2 that it is only tenable for the principal to consider that it
is aware that r1 is aware of f. Then the awareness di®erential for this class in the
memory of the principal is zero since this is the only active instance fromA2 relating
to r1. Whereas, if in addition it is tenable for the principal to consider that it is aware
that r1 is unaware of f, then the awareness di®erential becomes 0.33. Alternatively,
when it is only tenable that the principal considers that it is unaware that r1 is aware
of f and that it is unaware that r1 is unaware of f, then the principal is fully unaware
with respect to A2 since for both tenable instances the actual world of the principal
is w1. In this case, the awareness di®erential of the principal with respect toA2 is 2.3.
Overall, the awareness di®erential leans towards zero when the principal becomes
fully aware.
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De¯nition 2. A principal p is fully aware of  if for every tenable instance a with
respect to  in the memory of p, the actual world of p is w2 and ADiffðp;AiÞ ¼ 0,
where Ai is the class of a.
For instance, when the sender discloses information about the subject to a re-
cipient, the subject attains full awareness when only the instances labeled 1, 3, 7, 11,
19, 27 and 35 are tenable in Msu. This implies that the subject considers it tenable
that it is aware of f and aware that both the sender and recipient are aware of f. It
also considers it tenable that it is aware that the sender and recipient are aware of its
awareness of f. In addition, the subject considers that it is tenable that it is aware
that the sender is aware that the recipient is aware of f. Finally, the recipient is
aware that the sender is aware of f. At full awareness, the awareness di®erential for
su over all awareness classes is therefore
X4
i¼1
ADiffðsu;AiÞ ¼ 0:
5. Memory Transformation
The advantage of modeling (un)awareness using possible world semantics is the
ability to highlight how disclosure protocols transform the memory of objects as
information °ows from one object to another. To illustrate this, we represent the
disclosure protocol that results in (un)awareness transformations using transactions.
A transaction contains processes responsible for updating the memory of object on
what it is (un)aware in certain states. These transactions are labeled information
Request, Consent, Sent and Notice, respectively. Transactions and associated
processes are executed in sequence to ensure that the memory of objects does not end
up in invalid (un)awareness states. We assume at the beginning of a path, before an
information °ow occurs (t0), that the subject, sender and recipient are fully unaware.
Based on this assumption, tenable instances in the memory of the subject, sender and
recipient in Table 1 are labels 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 15–18, 23–26, 31–34 and 39–42 for Msu,
Ms and Mr, respectively.
A disclosure protocol constitutes a sequence of transactions that enables the
sender, subject and recipient of an information °ow to gain a level of awareness
ranging from being partially aware to fully aware after disclosure. The consequence
of a disclosure protocol in the memory of a principal at t1 after disclosure is two-
faceted. First, one or more previously tenable (un)awareness instances of the same
class and reference object(s) become untenable. Second, for the same class and ref-
erence object(s), one or more previously untenable (un)awareness instances become
tenable. This section highlights these memory transformations for Request,
Consent, Sent and Notice transactions.
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5.1. Request
This transaction involves a sender and a recipient, and is required to give the sender
an opportunity to consider if a recipient should gain awareness of information. This is
representative of a setting where privacy is achieved by enabling an object to accept
or reject another object's request to gain awareness of information. The semantics
involve a recipient requesting for information about a subject from a sender with a
request process. Tenable awareness instances in the memory of the recipient and
sender as a result of this transaction are shown in Table A.1 of Appendix A. There
are two scenarios where information can be requested by a recipient from a sender.
First is where the sender generates requested information about the subject. In such a
scenario, the sender is the custodian of information about the subject. The alter-
native scenario is where the sender is not in possession of the requested information.
In this case, the request can only be ful¯lled if the information is sought from the
subject. For example, in an event-driven system, a component (recipient) may re-
quest event noti¯cations about another component (subject) from the event broker
(sender). At the time of request, the broker is unaware of such noti¯cations from the
subject. Hence, the transaction can only be ful¯lled when noti¯cations are subse-
quently pushed by the subject component to the broker.
5.2. Consent
This transaction involves the sender and subject, and the aim is for a sender to disclose
information to a recipient only when granted permission to do so by the subject.
Obtaining Consent may be implicit where initiating the operation acts as the will-
ingness to disclose; otherwise it may be explicit, where the user is clearly presented with
an option to agree or disagree (opt-in or opt-out) of the collection or disclosure of
personal information [21]. Consent can be speci¯c or generic. The former involves a
sender seeking consent or the subject granting consent to disclose information to a
speci¯ed recipient. Hence, the sender has identi¯ed the recipients for which it is seeking
or granting consent. The subject is also informed or able to identify the recipients to
which information will be sent at the time Consent transaction is executed. Conversely,
generic Consent involves the sender seeking or the subject granting consent to disclose
information to unknown recipients. The semantics are as follows: The sender ¯rst seeks
consent from the subject to disclose information to a recipient with seekConsent.
Subsequently, the sought consent may be granted by the subject with grantConsent.
Tenable awareness instances in the memory of the subject and sender as a result of this
transaction for speci¯c consent are shown in Table A.4 of Appendix A.
A seekConsent process can also be executed in one of the two ways. In the ¯rst
case, the sender is the custodian of information about the subject for which the
disclosure consent is being sought. Hence, the sender is aware of information to be
disclosed at the point seekConsent is executed. Alternatively, the subject is the
source of information for which the consent is being sought. In this case, the subject
becomes aware of information to be disclosed at the point seekConsent is executed.
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After grantConsent is executed, it becomes tenable for the subject and sender to
consider that they are aware of the information for which the consent is being
granted. Hence, it is impossible for the subject to grant consent to disclose infor-
mation that it is not aware. Also, it is impossible for the sender to remain unaware of
the information it has been granted consent to disclose. Tenable instances ofA2,A3
and A4 are also dependent on whether the sender generates the information for
which the consent is being granted, or the subject is the source of the information.
Finally, when the consent is not granted by the subject for the information generated
by the sender, but rather it responds to the sender with an acknowledgment of
sought consent, then it is tenable for the subject to consider that it is aware of the
information for which the consent is denied. Hence, it is impossible for the subject to
acknowledge sought information that it is not aware (cf. Sec. 5.5).
5.3. Sent
This transaction enables a recipient to gain awareness of information about a subject
and involves a sender and a recipient. The semantics entail the sender disclosing
information to the recipient with a send process. After the execution of this process,
the recipient becomes aware of disclosed information with the corresponding trans-
formation in tenable A1–A4 instances in the memory of sender and recipient as
shown in Table A.2 of Appendix A.
5.4. Notice
A Notice transaction is used by an object to notify other objects of its state of
(un)awareness. There are primarily two types of noti¯cations  prominent and
discoverable [37]. Prominent notice is the one that is designed to catch the user's
attention and the user to inspect the outcome of their privacy options and choices.
Whereas, discoverable notice is the one that the user has to ¯nd. Irrespectively, they
both aim to achieve privacy by ensuring transparency  referring to openness to
users in the manner personal information is manipulated [3]. These include which
information is sent, who the receiver is and where the information came from. To
achieve transparency, it is then an obligation for each object to inform other parties
involved in an information °ow of its (un)awareness. Realizing full transparency across
parties involved in an information °ow requires six forms of Notice transactions
involving each pair of sender, subject and recipient as demonstrated in Table A.3
of Appendix A. For example, the transaction Notice:s–su is triggered by the sender to
a subject, and results in transforming the memory of the subject.
5.5. Process acknowledgments
An acknowledgment provides the guarantee of information receipt. In a social set-
ting, the mere act of a subject granting consent to disclose or the sender disclosing
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the information may provide enough guarantee that the sender (respectively, re-
cipient) is aware of the information. But this may not hold in a socio-technical
setting. For example, the information may be held up in a message bu®er not yet
accessed by the reference or principal object. Hence, for the guarantee of delivery, an
object may provide acknowledgment on receipt of the information. An acknowl-
edgment can occur after the execution of Request-, Sent-, Notice- and
Consent-related processes as shown in Table A.5 of Appendix A.
6. Disclosure Protocol Suite
The transactions in a disclosure protocol depend on its inherent processes:
– There are two variants of Request. These are Request, containing processes where
the recipient requests for information from the sender, followed by the acknowl-
edgment of request by the sender, and Request2, which only contains processes
where the recipient requests for information from the sender, without any
acknowledgment.
– There are eight variants of Consent. The ¯rst is Consent1 where the sender seeks
consent and then the subject grants consent. The second is Consent2, which
involves a process where the subject grants consent without the sender initially
seeking consent. The third variant is Consent3 where the sender seeks consent, but
is never granted by the subject. Furthermore, Consent4 and Consent5 extend
Consent1 and Consent2, respectively, with the acknowledgment of granted con-
sent by the sender. Whereas, Consent6, Consent7 and Consent8 extend
Consent1, Consent3 and Consent4, respectively, with the acknowledgment of
sought consent by the subject.
– Furthermore, there are two variants of Sent. First is Sent1, which contains pro-
cesses where the sender discloses information to the recipient, and a receipt is then
acknowledged by the recipient. The second is Sent2, and it only consists of a
process where the sender discloses information to the recipient, without any ac-
knowledgment of receipt.
– Finally, there are two variants for each pair of Notice transactions. For example,
Notice:s–su1 contains processes where a sender noti¯es the subject of its
(un)awareness and is thereafter acknowledged by the subject. Whereas, Notice:s–
su2 only consists of a process where the sender noti¯es the subject of its (un)
awareness, without any acknowledgment.
Altering the manner in which these di®erent transactions are combined leads to
disclosure protocols that uniquely transform the memory of an object. Ensuring that
the memory of objects remains consistent after the execution of a disclosure protocol
requires the assurance that only legitimate sequence of transactions is allowed in a
disclosure protocol. Furthermore, each transaction may transform instances of an
(un)awareness class di®erently. Hence, when two transactions are executed in
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sequence, then a set of rules is necessary to determine how transformations resulting
from one transaction override another.
6.1. Memory consistency
The legitimate sequence of transactions to ensure the memory of objects remains
sound in a valid state is speci¯ed using the precedence (adjacency) matrix in Fig. 7.
A Request transaction can only occur before Sent since the recipient can only
Fig. 7. Precedence (adjacency) matrix for a sequence of transactions. Shaded cells indicate that the
transaction T1 can be executed before T2 in a trace.
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request for information it is unaware. In contrast, a Request can occur before or after
any variant of Consent or Notice. A disclosure protocol cannot contain more than
one variant of Consent, and can only occur before Sent. This is important since
seeking and/or granting consent when the information is already disclosed invali-
dates the purpose of Consent. Similarly, a protocol cannot contain more than one
variant of Sent, which cannot occur before a Request or Consent. Finally, any
variant of Notice can occur before or after any other transaction in a disclosure
protocol. The resulting matrix is a state space of disclosure protocols, with traces
containing a minimum of one and a maximum of nine transactions, respectively.
When two transaction processes are executed in sequence and the resulting
transformation, for instance, of the same class and reference objects di®ers, then the
process transformation that contains fewer negations and achieves lower awareness
di®erential overrides the other. The general rules applied to determine how process
transformations override each other are described in Table A.6 of Appendix A. When
any variant of Notice occurs before a process, then the process overrides Notice.
Conversely, when a process occurs before any variant of Notice, then the process is
overridden by Notice. Interacting objects can also end up with di®erent awareness
di®erentials depending on the disclosure protocol. This di®erence is indicative of the
varying levels of awareness that transactions in the protocol generate in each object.
Based on this view, the memories of parties in an information °ow are only consistent
with each other when they are all fully aware. Whereas, partial awareness may
introduce some level of inconsistencies based on varying awareness di®erentials and
accounts for the uncertainty that objects may have about disclosed information.
6.2. Properties of disclosure protocols
The objective of privacy-preserving information disclosure is to transform the
memory of parties involved to varying levels of awareness, ranging from being fully
unaware to fully aware. Assume a simple information °ow characterized by a sender
(Bao) and a recipient (Oz), where Bao generates and discloses information about a
subject (Gor). Also, consider that the recipient is revealed at the point consent is
being sought and/or granted. Then each disclosure protocol trace may enable each
party to achieve more or less awareness of the information. For example, the trace
 ¼ (Consent1, Sent1, Notice:r–su, Notice:s–su, Notice:s–r) would enable Gor to
achieve more awareness compared to Bao and Oz. Whereas, the trace  ¼ (Consent2,
Notice:su–r, Request, Sent1, Notice:r–s) enables Oz and Bao to achieve more
awareness compared to Gor. We leverage on three metrics to characterize the impact
of disclosure protocols on the memory of objects.
6.2.1. Unawareness level
This is a measure of the extent an object remains unaware of information after
disclosure. This metric is determined by comparing the awareness di®erential in the
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memory of the object at t0 (i.e. full unawareness) with the di®erential at tn (after
disclosure) as follows:
ULðpÞ ¼
P
Ai ADiffðp;AiÞ
 
tnP
Ai ADiffðp;AiÞ
 
t0
;
where Ai 2 fA1;A2;A3;A4g.
As awareness di®erential in the memory of an object at tn turns towards zero, the
unawareness level of the object also turns towards zero. Hence the information is
more visible to the user. Otherwise, the object is less able to determine its awareness
of disclosed information and/or the awareness of other objects about the disclosed
information.
6.2.2. The cost of a disclosure protocol
This is a measure of the frequency at which instances in the memory of an object are
switched from being untenable to tenable or vice versa by a disclosure protocol
relative to another. Given i, the cost for an object is determined by
Costðp; iÞ ¼
j 4Mpji  HSizep
j 4Mpjmax  HSizemax
 tn 
actual
 discount;
where max is the disclosure protocol trace that generates the maximum number of
memory transformations at tn. Likewise, HSizep is the number of entries in p's
interaction history. This represents the impact of p's evolving roles as the subject,
sender and/or recipient of information up to tn using i. Whereas, HSizemax is the
maximum number of entries that can exist in the interaction history of an object at tn
given i. This cost is an indication of the actual overhead associated with using a
disclosure protocol in designing interaction between objects in software. From an
implementation viewpoint, the cost of a disclosure protocol indicates the resources
and e®ort required to realize its design. Whereas, from an end-user viewpoint, more
costly disclosure protocols may also be more disruptive. Finally, the actual cost can
be forfeited with a discount factor that ranges between zero and the actual cost,
which indicates the trade-o® for increased or reduced unawareness levels.
The utility derived when the software is designed to enable interaction between
objects based on a disclosure protocol depends on the privacy objective. When this
objective is to increase awareness and the visibility of disclosed information at low
cost, then privacy utility is computed as
Utilvisðp; iÞ ¼ ½1 ULðpÞ  Costðp; iÞ:
Alternatively, the objective is to increase unawareness and the secrecy of disclosed
information at low cost. This is computed as
Utilsecðp; iÞ ¼ ðULðpÞÞ  Costðp; iÞ:
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6.2.3. Degree of freedom
Constraining the disclosure behavior of users to a single protocol may inhibit the
usability of the software. A design which implements a functional requirement using
only one protocol provides minimum °exibility since users can only interact in one
way. Likewise, the software design becomes more °exible if a functional requirement
can be achieved using a set of alternative disclosure protocols that provide the same
or acceptable range of privacy satisfaction. For example, the two traces a ¼
(Consent2, Sent1, Notice:su–r) and b ¼ (Consent1, Sent1, Notice:r–su) will
generate similar unawareness levels and costs at ULðGorÞ ¼ 0.08 with
CostðGor; aÞ ¼ 0.69 and CostðGor, bÞ ¼ 0:69, respectively. Hence, a and b
provide the same level of privacy to Gor at the same cost. The number of disclosure
protocols that can be used in software design to achieve an object's privacy objective
is referred to as the degree of freedom (DoF) and determined by
DoFðpÞ ¼ j½Utilobjðp; iÞ  UtillimjjDPmatrixj
;
where DPmatrix is the set of disclosure protocols from the precedence matrix in Fig. 7.
The function Utilobj is the privacy utility realized by i 2 DPmatrix, when the ob-
jective is to enhance visibility or secrecy of disclosed information in the memory of p.
Whereas, min  Utillim  max is the threshold on acceptable range of privacy
utility. When the threshold is in¯nite, then every disclosure protocol trace in DPmatrix
can be used in enabling object interaction in the software design. In this case,
jDPmatrixj ¼ 36; 913; 048 with DoFðpÞ ¼ 1. This is a relatively large state space and
suggests the plethora of design options available to implement interaction between
objects. But this state space can be pruned based on search constraints; for instance,
by limiting the maximum and/or minimum number of transactions in a disclosure
protocol, and also protocols that contain, exclude, start with and/or end with a
speci¯c transaction. For example, if the designer is only interested in disclosure
protocols with a maximum of four transactions that contain any variant of Sent and
a Consent1, then the awareness system will generate a reduced state space with
jDPmatrixj ¼ 1580.
7. Case Studies
Overall, designing software that preserves privacy is a balance between the infor-
mation-°ow settings and the disclosure protocol(s) used to enable interaction in the
design. These settings are de¯ned by properties such as the roles of objects associated
with each °ow along a path, and also the duality/uniqueness of such roles; whether
the subject is the source of information being disclosed or the information is gener-
ated by or in custody of the sender; and ¯nally, whether the subject and/or sender
has identi¯ed the information recipients at the point consent is sought and/or
granted. Whereas, the degree of freedom broadly indicates °exibility in the manner
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software can be designed. In this section, we present two case studies to investigate
the impact of these factors on real-world system implementation. The ¯rst study is a
reverse engineering of the Twitter followership network to understand highlighted
factors in its design. The second study is a scenario analysis involving a family of
design patterns for realizing service-oriented software systems.
7.1. Methodology
Given a design that highlights the expected behavior of a system, we map observable
interaction patterns noted in the software design to disclose protocol traces. We
achieve this by the systematic analysis of functional speci¯cation as follows:
(1) Identify objects and their actions from behavioral speci¯cations.
(2) Abstract roles of objects from identi¯ed interactions.
(3) Map actions to transactions to identify the associated disclosure protocol.
After the information-°ow settings and disclosure protocols are discovered from a
software design, the e®ectiveness of the design can be investigated using PriSAT. A
designer can specify the disclosure protocols and information-°ow settings over an
interaction network. PriSAT then determines the extent a privacy objective is sat-
is¯ed. Alternatively, given an information-°ow setting, PriSAT determines the ap-
propriate set of disclosure protocols that can be used to realize a privacy objective.
We applied this methodology to evaluate the privacy-preserving capabilities in the
design of private interactions on Twitter [51] and service-based software.
7.2. The design of private interactions on Twitter
Twitter is a social networking platform where users interact predominately via a
followership network [51]. Users are expected to register with the service before they
can interact with other users. Once registered, the interaction is fostered by a user
following another user to gain visibility of the messages they tweet, retweet, like or
reply. The relationship between a followed user and the follower is not symmetric.
Also, disclosure behavior is dependent on whether the users choose to interact pri-
vately or publicly in their privacy con¯gurations. In this study, we focus on a scenario
where a user interacts with its followers privately as shown in Fig. 8.
When a user follows another user, then the follower is the recipient and the
followed user is the sender. This action implies that the recipient is requesting for the
visibility of all actions executed by the sender on a message. When the followed user
account is set as private, then a followership request from the follower has to be
explicitly con¯rmed by the followed user. This corresponds to Request1 transaction
considering that a followership request from a recipient matches the request pro-
cess, while a con¯rmation from the sender is ackRequest. When a message is
tweeted, the follower is the recipient while the followed user is the source of the tweet
and therefore the sender and subject. The follower may like a private tweet, while a
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reply is considered a new message and not bound by the privacy settings of the
followed user. A \like" action can be initiated by the followed user or follower, who,
respectively, assumes the role of a sender. If initiated by a followed user, then its
followers are the recipients. Whereas, the visibility of an action on a tweet that is
initiated by a follower is dependent on whether or not the tweet is private. For a
private tweet, the followed user and its other con¯rmed followers each assume the
role of a recipient. These actions correspond to a Sent2 transaction, since the
propagation of a message by a sender is not acknowledged by the respective reci-
pients. Hence, the corresponding disclosure protocol for interacting privately on
Twitter is 1 ¼ ðRequest1; Sent2Þ, which matches the scenario where a private user
is followed by other users, then the followed user or follower tweets, likes, replies or
retweets a message.
7.2.1. Followership design on Twitter
There are diverse followership scenarios in a private setting. A user may choose to
follow or unfollow another user at any time and a message tweet does not always
attract the same amount of likes from a set of followers. This results in a changing
followership network for every message that is tweeted. The scenario in Fig. 9
represents a user F0 that tweets a private message to ¯ve of its followers F1–F5. This
results in ¯ve information-°ow paths with an interaction history where F0 assumes a
dual role of the subject and sender ¯ve times, with each follower being a recipient
once. At this point, the followership design in Fig. 8 yields a maximum expected
Fig. 8. Sequence diagram of the followership-based interactions on Twitter platform and the associated
transactions.
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positive utility of 0.2 for F0 when 1 is used to enable interaction and the privacy
objective to reduce unawareness levels. Whereas, the followers F1–F5 all derive
negative utility with the mean of 0.01 across all users. When F1 subsequently likes
the tweet, the interaction network is extended to nine information-°ow paths, with
F0 assuming an additional role of a recipient while F1 assumes the role of a sender ¯ve
times. This action improves the mean privacy utility to 0.1 for all users in the
network. Overall, it is observed that the unawareness level of users reduces and
privacy utility increases with each like action on a tweet. A maximum mean utility of
0.2 is reached when all the followers have liked the tweet. At this point, a total of
1305 paths would have been generated.
Based on the outlined scenario, the research question is whether there is an al-
ternative followership design that improves the expected utility for users given a
privacy objective. We note that an objective to maximize information visibility
cannot necessarily be realized by using a trace with high number of transactions and
processes. For example, the trace max ¼ ðRequest1, Consent8, Sent1, Notice:s–su1,
Notice:su–s1, Notice:s–r1, Notice:r–s1, Notice:r–su1, Notice:su–r1) results in
ULðF0Þ ¼ 0, CostðF0; maxÞ ¼ 1 and UtilvisðF0; maxÞ ¼ 1. This represents a state
where F0 achieves full awareness but at the maximum cost and hence the worst
negative utility. Utilizing max for interaction is only viable when F0 discounts its
associated cost of interaction. Likewise, once the information is disclosed, it is im-
possible for a privacy objective of maximizing information secrecy to be realized with
Fig. 9. Twitter interaction after a private message is tweeted from F0 to its ¯ve followers and the sub-
sequent like action executed by each follower using 1 and discount ¼ 0.
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a utility of 1. This is because any disclosure protocol used will result in some un-
awareness reduction in either the subject, sender and/or recipient. Thus, the impact
of these contending factors can be mitigated by leveraging on the utility values to
determine the extent a privacy objective is satis¯ed.
To investigate an alternative design, DoF analysis was carried out on the outlined
scenario using PriSAT. The analysis focused on identifying potential lightweight
refactorings where inherent transactions in the design are preserved but augmented
with variants of Consent or Notice. In this way, the functional properties of the
followership network remain unchanged. PriSAT was used to search the precedence
matrix for traces that start with Request1, may contain any variant of Consent and
end with Sent2. The outcome was a reduced state space with jDPmatrixj ¼ 9 which
includes 1 and the traces (Request1; Consent½1j2j . . . j8; Sent2). Also, since the
followership network is bound by a con¯rmation of follow request by the followed, it
was assumed that the subject and sender have identi¯ed the information recipient at
the point the consent is sought.
Figure 10 illustrates the outcome of DoF analysis based on traces that matched
our Consent search criteria. For F0, the traces (Request1; Consent½2j3j5j7, Sent2)
generated a utility greater than 1 which ranged between 0.4 and 0.6. Whereas,
(Request1; Consent½1j6, Sent2) o®ered utilities similar to 1 while (Request1;
Consent½4j8, Sent2) did not o®er better utilities compared to 1. For F1, the traces
(Request1; Consent½1j4j6j8, Sent2) generated lesser utility values ranging between
Fig. 10. The DoFs in realizing categories of privacy utilities for a private message tweet from F0 to F1–F5
with every follower responding with a like action. The dotted marker indicates the DoF classi¯cation for 1
and the DPmatrix contains the traces where 1 is augmented with a variant of Consent transaction.
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0 and 0.1, while (Request1; Consent½2j3j5j7, Sent2) yields the same utility as 1.
Likewise for F2–F5, the traces that contained variants of Consent resulted in the
same utility as 1. A similar pattern of utility variance with DoF was observed
irrespective of the number of followers associated with F0. It is therefore concluded
that augmenting Twitter fellowship design with variants of Consent transactions
only enhances privacy utility for the subject that tweets a private message. Whereas,
the utility for its followers is not improved.
The second refactoring involved augmenting existing design with a combination
of acknowledged Notice transactions. Hence, PriSAT was used to search the pre-
cedence matrix for traces that start with Request1, followed by Sent2 and may end
with a combination of one or more forms of Notice transactions without acknowl-
edgment. This generated a state space with jDPmatrixj ¼ 64 which contained 1 and
the traces (Request1; Sent2; 2X), where X ¼ fNotice:s–su2, Notice:su–s2, Notice:
r–su2, Notice:su–r2, Notice:s–r2, Notice:r–s2g. The performance of 1 against
Notice-related traces is shown in Fig. 11. For F0, all traces generated utility values
greater than 1. Furthermore, three traces consisting of ðRequest1, Sent2; 2Xþ),
where Xþ ¼ fNotice:su–r2, Notice:su–s2g generated utility values ranging be-
tween 0.3 and 0.4, respectively. The remaining 60 traces provided signi¯cantly im-
proved utility values that ranged between 0.7 and 0.9, respectively. Likewise, for
F1–F5, 15 traces consisting of (Request1; Sent2; 2
Xþþ), where Xþþ ¼ fNotice:s–su2,
Notice:su–s2, Notice:r–su2, Notice:su–r2g had no improved performance over 1.
Fig. 11. The DoFs in realizing categories of privacy utilities for a private message tweet from F0 to F1–F5
with every follower responding with a like action. The dotted marker indicates the DoF classi¯cation for 1
and the DPmatrix contains traces where 1 is augmented with combinations of Notice transactions.
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Whereas, the remaining 48 traces provided better utility values that ranged between
0.4 and 0.6, respectively. Again, a similar pattern of utility variance with DoF was
observed irrespective of the number of followers associated with F0. Thus, given an
objective to minimize user's unawareness, privacy utility on Twitter followership
design for exchanging private tweets can be enhanced by augmenting inherent dis-
closure protocol with DPtwitter ¼ ðRequest1; Sent2; DPau), where DPau represents the
combination of Notice transactions from the set DPau ¼ X Xþþ and Xþ  Xþþ.
7.2.2. Discussion
A key insight is that the maximum privacy utility inherent in Twitter followership
design is marginal compared to an alternative design that is augmented with a subset
from a combination of Notice transactions. This makes the latter a preferred design
when the objective is to broadly maximize the visibility of information in the net-
work. For example, the relative improvements in privacy utilities for F0–F5 can be
observed in Fig. 12 where  01 ¼ ðRequest1; Sent2; Notice:s–r2) 2 DPtwitter is used
for interaction, compared to 1 in Fig. 9. A maximum mean utility of 0.6 is reached
when all the followers have liked a tweet using  01 compared to 0.2 that is derived
using 1. We note that refactoring an existing design to achieve a privacy objective
may further require domain-speci¯c design choices. For instance, refactoring the
followership design in Fig. 8 to realize  01 will require that a sender does not only
disclose a message to the recipient, but also inform the recipient of other recipients to
which it discloses the same message (see the design extension in Fig. 13).
Fig. 12. Twitter interaction after a private message is tweeted from F0 to its ¯ve followers and the
subsequent like action executed by each follower using  01 ¼ ðRequest1; Sent2; Notice:s–r2).
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Alternatively, a privacy objective may be to reduce visibility, for example, making
information less visible for all users in the network or a subset of users. For the
former, 1 is the preferred disclosure protocol compared to 
0
1. Both protocols yield
mean positive and negative utilities of 0.35 and 0.07, respectively, when the privacy
objective is to maximize information secrecy. Whereas, when the privacy objective is to
achieve varying information visibilities, then a followership design which uses a single
disclosure protocol to foster interaction does not necessarily provide an equal amount
of privacy utility for each user on the network. This is illustrated in Figs. 9 and 12
where the privacy utility for the subject F0 tends to di®er signi¯cantly from other users.
These ¯ndings suggest privacy in Twitter's software design can be enhanced in
one of the two ways. The ¯rst is informing users of their changing privacy utility as
their personal information °ows from one user to another in the network. Users can
then adjust their disclosure behavior to mitigate emerging privacy concerns. Second,
variability in privacy utility can be managed by enabling users to specify their
privacy objectives and expected utilities. Disclosure protocols are then dynamically
selected by the platform during interaction to satisfy a privacy objective.
Fig. 13. Refactoring Twitter followership design to realize Notice:s–r2.
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We have only considered lightweight refactorings where inherent transactions in
the design are preserved but augmented with variants of Consent or Notice
transactions. Whereas, there are other refactoring options; for example, considering a
combination of Notice transactions before and after Sent1 is executed, as well as
traces that contain Consent and Notice with varying precedence. Again, we as-
sumed that a message has only one subject and after a tweet, the authorship and
attribution of the message do not change. Whereas, it is possible to have a message
associated with multiple subjects; for example, when the message mentions another
user via a UserTag. The structural/semantic changes to the message make the user
that is tagged a co-owner and also a subject.
7.3. The privacy analysis of service-based software design
Interactions between components in distributed software applications are often or-
chestrated as services. A service is a discoverable software entity that can exist as a
single instance and interacts synchronously or asynchronously with applications and
other services through a loosely coupled communication model [42]. This concept is
based on a software architectural style that de¯nes an interaction between three
primary entities: the service producer, who publishes a service description and pro-
vides the implementation for the service; a service consumer, who uses the service;
and the service broker that enables interaction between the producer and consumer
[30]. There are two main interaction patterns involving identi¯ed entities [19, 50].
The ¯rst is a message pattern where all communication (information °ow) that
occurs between a service producer and a consumer is mediated by a service
broker [42]. The alternative pattern is where information °ow occurs in a peer-to-
peer fashion following the \register–¯nd–bind–execute" paradigm [36]. The producer
registers a service contract in a public registry that exists on the broker. This registry
is queried by consumers to ¯nd services that match certain criteria. If the registry has
such a service, the broker provides the consumer with the contract and an endpoint
address to bind directly with the producer. Both interaction patterns are often
constrained by Quality-of-Service (QoS) assurances to satisfy certain nonfunctional
requirements. More importantly, these patterns o®er di®erent interaction patterns
amongst service objects. In this subsection, we articulate a subset of these scenarios
to gain insights into their privacy-preservation capabilities.
7.3.1. Broker-mediated interaction pattern
In broker-mediated service interaction, information °ow is initiated via the broker
using a push/pull mechanism or a hybrid of both as shown in Fig. 14. When the
producer pushes a message to the broker, then the producer grants consent for the
broker to disclose the message to any set of consumers. Where the QoS necessitates
that the broker responds with acknowledgment after the consent is granted, then
the matching transaction it is Consent2, otherwise it is Consent5. Alternatively, the
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In
t. 
J. 
So
ft.
 E
ng
. K
no
w
l. 
En
g.
 2
01
9.
29
:1
55
7-
16
04
. D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 w
w
w
.w
or
ld
sc
ie
nt
ifi
c.c
om
by
 U
N
IV
ER
SI
TY
 O
F 
G
LA
SG
O
W
 o
n 
03
/1
0/
20
. R
e-
us
e 
an
d 
di
str
ib
ut
io
n 
is 
str
ic
tly
 n
ot
 p
er
m
itt
ed
, e
xc
ep
t f
or
 O
pe
n 
A
cc
es
s a
rti
cl
es
.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Fig. 14. Analysis of broker-mediated architectural models for service-based interaction.
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broker may pull the message from the producer. In this case, the broker is seeking
consent from the producer to disclose the message to any set of consumers, with
consent subsequently granted by the producer. Typically, the broker and producer
have no knowledge of the consumer at this point. The matching transaction is either
Consent1, Consent4, Consent6 or Consent8, and it depends on whether or not the
QoS guarantees acknowledgment. The broker may then send the message to the
consumer via a push mechanism. The matching transaction is either Sent1 or Sent2
and again depends on the associated QoS assurances. Alternatively, the consumer
may pull the message from the broker. In this case, the consumer ¯rst requests for a
message about the producer from the broker. This matches a variant of Request
transaction. Subsequently, the broker sends the requested message to the consumer
to match Sent1 or Sent2 transaction depending on QoS assurances. MQTT, pop-
ularly used to implement IoT device-to-device interaction, is an example of a stan-
dard messaging speci¯cation based on broker-mediated interaction model [18]. Other
examples include the Java Message Service (JMS) [33] and its implementation such
as Apache ActiveMQ [52]. There are a number of interaction scenarios based on this
pattern. These are as follows.
Scenario 1. Interaction between parties is achieved strictly via a push mechanism.
The producer grants message disclosure consent to the broker. Subsequently, the
message is disclosed by the broker to the consumer. As illustrated in Fig. 14(a),
interaction between parties is realized using one of the four disclosure protocols from
(Consent½2j5, Sent½1j2).
Scenario 2. Interaction between parties is achieved strictly via a pull mechanism.
The broker ¯rst seeks consent to disclose a message from the producer. Subsequently,
consent is granted by the producer. Afterwards, the consumer requests the message
from the broker. Finally, the message is disclosed by the broker to the consumer.
Interaction is realized using one of the 16 disclosure protocols from (Consent½1j4j6j8,
Request½1j2, Sent½1j2) as illustrated in Fig. 14(b).
Scenario 3. Interaction between parties is achieved via a hybrid push–pull mech-
anism. First, the producer grants message disclosure consent to the broker. After-
wards, the consumer requests for the message from the broker. Finally, the message is
disclosed by the broker to the consumer. For this case, the interaction is realized
using one of the eight disclosure protocols from (Consent½2j5, Request½1j2,
Sent½1j2) as illustrated in Fig. 14(c).
Scenario 4. Interaction between parties is achieved via a hybrid pull–push mech-
anism. The broker ¯rst seeks consent to disclose a message from the producer.
Subsequently, consent is granted by the producer. Finally, the message is disclosed
by the broker to the consumer. As illustrated in Fig. 14(d), the interaction between
parties is realized using one of the eight disclosure protocols from (Consent½1j4j6j8,
Sent½1j2).
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7.3.2. Broker-facilitated interaction pattern
When interaction occurs in a peer-to-peer fashion, then message passing only takes
place during binding and execution. The broker facilitates this by enabling the
producer and consumer to discover each other via a push or pull mechanism, as well
as the hybrid of both. This is initiated when the producer pushes a contract which
typically contains the services it produces and its uniform resource identi¯er to the
broker. This is synonymous to a producer notifying the broker of its capabilities.
Depending on whether there exist QoS guarantees of acknowledgment, the matching
disclosure transaction is a variant of Notice:su–s where the subject is a producer and
the sender a broker. Alternatively, the broker can initiate a pull request for contracts
from the producer, who then responds by publishing the contracts on the broker. In
this case, the matching disclosure transaction is a variant of Request, which is then
followed by a variant of Notice:su–s. Likewise, the consumer discovers service
contracts by initiating a pull request on the broker's matching variants of Request,
followed by a Notice:s–r where the broker acts as a sender and the consumer a
recipient. The broker may also push service contracts to the consumer without prior
request.
Once the consumer discovers a service contract, it then binds with the producer.
At this point, the consumer invokes or initiates an interaction with the producer
using the binding details in the service contract to locate, contact and invoke the
service. The matching disclosure transaction is a variant of Request. The successful
invocation of a service typically results in a functional execution by the producer and
the result is returned to the consumer. This matches Sent1 or Sent2 transactions,
depending on whether there exist QoS guarantees of acknowledgment. Examples of
distributed software frameworks and standards based on broker-facilitated interac-
tion patterns include the Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP), Representational
State Transfer (REST) for Web services and its reference implementations such as
Java API for RESTful Web Services (JAX-RS) [31] and Jersey [32]. Interaction
scenarios based on this service model include the following.
Scenario 5. Interaction between parties is achieved using a push with binding. The
producer ¯rst noti¯es broker of a service contract. This is followed by the broker
notifying a consumer of the producer's service contract. The consumer then makes a
message request to the producer based on the service contract. Finally, the message is
disclosed by the producer to the consumer. As illustrated in Fig. 15(a), interaction
between parties is realized using one of the 16 disclosure protocols from (Notice:su-
s½1j2, Notice:s–r½1j2,Request½1j2, Sent½1j2).
Scenario 6. Interaction between parties is achieved using a pull with binding. The
broker ¯rst requests for a contract from the producer, who responds by notifying the
broker of a service contract. Next, the consumer requests for matching contract from
the broker's registry, with the broker responding by notifying the consumer of the
contract o®ered by the producer. The consumer then makes a message request to the
1590 I. Omoronyia, U. Etuk & P. Inglis
In
t. 
J. 
So
ft.
 E
ng
. K
no
w
l. 
En
g.
 2
01
9.
29
:1
55
7-
16
04
. D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 w
w
w
.w
or
ld
sc
ie
nt
ifi
c.c
om
by
 U
N
IV
ER
SI
TY
 O
F 
G
LA
SG
O
W
 o
n 
03
/1
0/
20
. R
e-
us
e 
an
d 
di
str
ib
ut
io
n 
is 
str
ic
tly
 n
ot
 p
er
m
itt
ed
, e
xc
ep
t f
or
 O
pe
n 
A
cc
es
s a
rti
cl
es
.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 15. Analysis of broker-facilitated architectural models for service-based interaction. Privacy utilities
are determined without cost discount on the disclosure protocols.
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producer based on the service contract. Finally, the message is disclosed by the
producer to the consumer. This interaction scenario is realized using one of 64 dis-
closure protocols from (Request½1j2, Notice:su-s½1j2, Request½1j2,
Notice:s–r½1j2, Request½1j2, Sent½1j2) as illustrated in Fig. 15(b).
Scenario 7. Interaction between parties is achieved using a hybrid push–pull with
binding. The producer ¯rst noti¯es broker of a service contract. Next, the consumer
requests for a matching contract from the broker's registry, with the broker
responding by notifying the consumer of the contract o®ered by the producer. The
consumer then makes a message request to the producer based on the service con-
tract. Finally, the message is disclosed by the producer to the consumer. This is
illustrated in Fig. 16(a), and realized using one of the 32 disclosure protocols from
(Notice:su-s½1j2, Request½1j2, Notice:s–r½1j2, Request½1j2, Sent½1j2).
Scenario 8. Interaction between parties is achieved using a hybrid pull–push with
binding. The broker ¯rst requests for a contract from the producer, who responds by
notifying the broker of a service contract. The broker then noti¯es the consumer of
the contract o®ered by the producer. The consumer then makes a message request to
the producer based on the service contract. This ends with the message being dis-
closed by the producer to the consumer. This is illustrated in Fig. 16(b), and realized
using one of the 32 disclosure protocols from (Request½1j2, Notice:su-s½1j2,
Notice:s–r½1j2, Request½1j2, Sent½1j2).
7.3.3. Discussion
A key insight from carrying out the scenario analysis of service interaction patterns
relates to the DoF in realizing a design. Scenarios 1–4 can be realized using one of the
4, 16, 8 and 8 disclosure protocols, respectively. Whereas, Scenarios 5–8 can be
realized using one of the 16, 64, 32 and 32 disclosure protocols, respectively. Hence, it
can be inferred that the °exibility in designing a service-based distributed software is
dependent on whether the interaction is modeled using push or pull mechanism or a
combination of both, and also with or without message binding.
Furthermore, there is a limit to the privacy-preserving capability of each inter-
action pattern. It is observed that the choice to design a software system based on a
pattern may inhibit or enhance the ability of producer, broker and/or consumer to
realize a privacy objective. For example, the plot in Fig. 14(a) shows privacy utilities
realized by the producer, broker and consumer for the visibility and secrecy objec-
tives in Scenario 1. When the objective is to maximize message visibility, then the
maximum privacy utility realized by the producer is 0.01, and is achieved using
(Consent5, Sent½1j2). This is insigni¯cant, compared to the mean utilities of 0.33
and 0.43 realized by the broker and consumer across all the disclosure protocols that
can be used in the scenario. Conversely, the same producer would realize a maximum
privacy utility of 0.63 using (Consent2, Sent½1j2) when the objective is to maximize
secrecy. The broker and consumer also realize relatively signi¯cant privacy utilities.
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Hence, it is concluded that when a service-oriented design is achieved strictly using a
push mechanism, then the maximum privacy utility is realized when the objective is
to maximize message secrecy across interacting parties.
Again, the plot in Fig. 14(b) illustrates the privacy utilities realized by parties in
Scenario 2. It is observed that any disclosure protocol used in this scenario o®ers a
(a)
(b)
Fig. 16. Analysis of broker-facilitated architectural models for service-based interaction. Privacy utilities
are determined without cost discount on the disclosure protocols.
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negative privacy utility to the producer when the objective is to maximize message
visibility. Whereas, the broker and consumer will satisfy the same objective irre-
spective of the disclosure protocol used, with mean utilities of 0.19 and 0.42, re-
spectively, across the 16 disclosure protocols that can be used in this scenario. This
suggests that a pull mechanism is less suitable for a service-oriented design when the
objective is to maximize the extent the information is visible to the producer. Con-
versely, when the objective is to maximize secrecy, mean privacy utilities of 0.56, 0.07
and 0.30 are realized by the producer, broker and consumer, respectively. This
suggests that it is less e±cient to achieve a service-oriented design using a pull
mechanism when the privacy objective is to maximize the extent the message
remains secret to the broker. Similar reasoning can be applied to Scenarios 3–8 to
evaluate their suitability in realizing a privacy objective in a software design.
Observed variance in privacy utilities implies that instantiating a pattern in a
service-oriented design may involve some compromise in privacy by either the pro-
ducer, broker and/or consumer. A plot of mean utilities across all the disclosure
protocols for each analyzed scenario is illustrated in Fig. 17. When the software is
designed based on pull, push or a hybrid of both (marked S1–S4, respectively, in
Fig. 17), then the broker and consumer would signi¯cantly know more about the
message than the message producer. Similarly, when the design strategy is to ensure
that the message being disclosed is least visible to the broker, then the appropriate
design choice is a push with binding interaction pattern (marked S5 in Fig. 17).
Alternatively, the design strategy may be to ensure that the message disclosed is
equally visible to the parties involved. Then the appropriate design choice is a hybrid
push–pull with binding interaction pattern (marked S7 in Fig. 17). This pattern
o®ers the least variance in privacy utility between interacting parties.
This exploration of service-oriented design patterns provides insights on how a
designer can select a design pattern based on a privacy objective, the privacy utility
that a pattern provides and the satisfaction of desired functional requirements.
8. Threats to Validity and Future work
In our case studies, we leveraged on alternative documentation available in the
public domain and observed the behavior of running systems to build the interaction
Fig. 17. Mean utilities across all the disclosure protocols for Scenarios 1–8.
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models. In future work, we intend to automate this task by augmenting the design
artifacts familiar to designers in their daily work with insights on privacy implica-
tions. We expect that such automation will reduce the knowledge gap required to
consider privacy during early-stage software design.
Our technique precludes factors such as the adversarial or cooperative tendencies
of objects and also the level of sensitivity of disclosed information. Also, memory
transformations during object interaction and implied awareness are solely deter-
mined by the executed disclosure protocols. This means that by only relying on
transactions in the disclosure protocol suite, there are memory states that cannot be
reached from an assumed initial state of full unawareness. For example, it is im-
possible to realize a disclosure protocol that renders all elements in the memory of a
principal tenable. Whereas, it is easy to see that such a memory state is unintuitive
from a socio-technical viewpoint, since this will infer an object denies its awareness
after disclosure even though it is tenable that it is aware. Hence, it can be concluded
that a disclosure protocol that makes an object to realize such a state should not be
allowed in a software design. The open research question is to determine whether all
unreachable memory states are also unintuitive from a socio-technical context, and
therefore not relevant for privacy management.
The analysis of a disclosure protocols state space is a reachability problem of
determining whether there is a disclosure protocol that makes a certain awareness
state reachable from an initial state of full unawareness. Addressing this problem
requires: (1) identifying all memory states that an object can assume based on Table 1;
(2) determining which identi¯ed states are intuitive from a socio-technical viewpoint;
(3) inferring whether there is a disclosure protocol that makes the state reachable; and
¯nally (4) the impact that such reached/unreachable state has on privacy. A memory
leak then exists when there is an unreachable state that is intuitive from a socio-
technical viewpoint. Otherwise, the disclosure protocol suite can be considered as
complete. Therefore, we do not claim in this research that the disclosure protocol suite
is complete and prevents all memory leaks. Making such a claim by addressing
highlighted tasks is beyond the scope of this paper and the focus of future work.
A broader picture of the relationship between end users, software designers and
regulations is multi-dimensional, whereas this research only sets the foundation for
understanding this relationship from a designer's viewpoint. Finally, although we
assume that the (un)awareness modeled in objects is the same as their users', this
deterministic assumption may sometimes not hold.
9. Conclusions
This paper presents a technique for analyzing the privacy-preserving capabilities of
software design. First, possible world semantics are used to demonstrate how the
memory of user objects in a behavioral design representation transforms during
interaction, where an object's memory is de¯ned in terms of what its respective users
are aware or unaware of the disclosed information. The more unaware an object is
A Privacy Awareness System for Software Design 1595
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about the disclosed information, the more secret the information is to its user.
Conversely, the more aware an object is about the disclosed information, the more
visible the information is to its user. Privacy engineering during software design then
involves determining the appropriate disclosure protocol that can be used in the
design to ensure a level of information secrecy or visibility when objects are inter-
acting. Hence, we de¯ne a disclosure protocol that constitutes information Request,
Consent, Sent and Notice transactions, and characterize ensuing object memory
transformations when any of the transaction is triggered as part of information dis-
closure. Finally, given a privacy objective to maximize information visibility or
secrecy, a privacy awareness system is used to determine the privacy utility that users
derive when interaction between objects is designed based on a disclosure protocol.
Our approach was evaluated based on two case studies. First, we carried out an
analysis of the followership design on the Twitter social networking platform. We
demonstrated the variability in the range of privacy utilities that a followed user and
its followers can derive as a message is tweeted, retweeted or liked in the network. We
then investigated a refactoring of the followership design with variants of Consent
and Notice. The results showed that with a privacy objective to maximize message
visibility, refactoring the Twitter followership with Consent did not signi¯cantly
improve privacy utility. Whereas, for the same privacy objective, refactoring the
design with Notice showed a signi¯cant improvement in privacy utility across
interacting parties. The broader insight is that the design of software where user
objects are associated with emergent properties and therefore changing privacy
objectives needs to be adaptive privacy ready [41].
The second case study involved the scenario analysis of service-based software
design patterns. Two categories involving a broker either mediating or facilitating
interaction between information producers and service providers were analyzed.
Our study results showed that °exibility in designing a privacy-preserving service-
oriented system is also dependent on the design pattern used to mediate or facilitate
interactions. These patterns include pull, push as well as their hybrid combined with
or without binding. We demonstrated the strengths and weaknesses of each pattern
in satisfying a privacy objective. The broader insight is the relationship between
software design patterns and the satisfaction of a privacy objective.
The use of proposed technique in practice depends on two steps. First, the soft-
ware designer articulates the features to be implemented using a model-driven design
technique. Second, the designer de¯nes a privacy objective to be realized in the
design. This is speci¯ed in terms of the desired level of information secrecy or visi-
bility. A subset of disclosure protocols that minimize privacy risk in the design is then
proposed.
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Appendix A
Table A.1. Tenable instances in the memory of recipient and sender at tn as a result of Request.
Table A.2. Tenable instances in the memory of sender and recipient at tn as a result of Sent.
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Table A.3. Tenable instances in the memory of subject, sender and recipient at tn as a result of Notice.
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Table A.4. Tenable instances in the memory of subject and sender at tn as a result of Consent.
Note: *Speci¯c consent.
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Table A.5. Tenable instances in the memory of subject, sender and recipient at tn after the
Acknowledgment of Request-, Sent-, Notice- and Consent-related processes.
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